Introduction
The recent outpouring of research on imperfect competition in international trade has called into question many of the lessons of traditional trade theory.
One of the most striking contrasts between "new" and traditional trade theories concerns the optimality of export subsidies.
If markets are competitive, export subsidies should be zero in a small open economy and should be negative if the economy has monopoly power in trade.
By contrast, Brander and Spencer (1985) were the first to show that, in a Cournot duopoly setting, an export subsidy to a home firm is desirable because it raises the firm's market share and profits at the expense ^f its foreign competitor.
This surprising departure from conventional wisdom has naturally generated a great deal of controversy, and subsequent work has shown that the case for export subsidies is subject to significant qualifications: for example, Eaton and Grossman (1986) show that, if firms compete on price rather than quantity (so that firms play a Bertrand rather than a Cournot game), then the optimal policy is an export tax rather than a subsidy.
Nevertheless, the case of Cournot duopoly has such a central place in oligopoly theory that the argument for export subsidies based on it cannot easily be dismissed and, indeed, it has proved to be highly influential in See also Cheng (1988) . The case for a positive subsidy is also weakened if the foreign government retaliates (Brander and Spencer, 1985) , if there is more than one home firm (Dixit, 1984) , if subsidised firms compete for scarce factors of production (Dixit and Grossman, 1986) or if entry to the industry is free (Markusen and Venables, 1988) .
For an overview of this literature, see Neary (1988) , where I also show how the Brander-Spencer result may be related to the traditional results of competitive trade theory.
policy debates.
However, an issue which has not been adequately explored is, if subsidies are indeed optimal, which firms should be more favoured. As already noted, Eaton and Grossman (1986) have shown that optimal policy in this case is an export tax rather than a subsidy. However, this result assumes that governments move before firms, whereas there is substantial anecdotal evidence (see, especially, Carmichael, 1987 ) that the opposite timing of moves is adopted in practice.
In this paper, I explore this issue
This raises two questions: is the optimal policy in the "government moves second" game a positive subsidy or not?; and, does this optimal policy yield a higher level of welfare than either free trade or the optimal "government moves first" policy? These issues are addressed in Section 5, where the roles of both types of cost asymmetry in affecting the answers are explored.
Section 6 then examines the case where both home and foreign governments compete in this framework. Finally, the paper's conclusions and some suggestions for further research are noted in Section 7. Whatever the reason for an asymmetry between social and private costs, it seems plausible to assume that 5 will typically be greater than unity and may be significantly so.
Cournot Competition with Linear
With the welfare function as specified in (2.7), it is straightforward to calculate the relationship between the optimal export subsidy and the level of home output at the optimum.
Totally differentiating (2.7) yields:
(2.8) dU = [p-c+(l-6)s]dx + xdp + (l-S)xds.
Using (2.1) to eliminate dp and the home firm's first-order condition (2.2) to simplify the coefficient of dx, this becomes: financed by taxes on labour earnings, imply a value for 6 between 1.10 and 4.03, with his preferred estimates lying between 1.32 and 1.47. I assume that any change in subsidy payments (whether an increase or decrease) is accommodated by a change in tax revenue and that there is some other component of public spending (e.g., public goods) which must always be financed.
This ensures that the value of 6 is the same whether s is positive or negative. It may seem paradoxical to argue that governments should provide more help to relatively profitable firms than to unprofitable ones. The paradox is resolved by noting that the motive for subsidisation in this model is not to encourage learning by doing but to raise home profits at the expense of foreign competitors. The more competitive is the home firm, the greater is its "comparative advantage in rent-shifting" and hence the greater the payoff to subsidising it. However, if the shadow price of government funds mandates an export tax rather than a subsidy, then the tax should be higher the more competitive the home firm: with revenue-raising now the dominant consideration, a firm should be more highly taxed the more efficient it is as a generator of tax revenue.
Cournot Competition with General Demands
Equation (2.11) shows a neat separability between the effects on the g optimal subsidy of the two types of cost asymmetry. However, this reflects the assumption of linear demand and so it is necessary to investigate,, the robustness of the results when a general form is assumed for the demand function. In this section, I continue to assume that the home and foreign firms produce a homogeneous product, but the demand curve they face now takes, instead of (2.1), the general form, p(x+y). Profit maximisation by the home firm therefore implies the first-order condition: (3.1) n -xp'+p-c+s = 0.
Using this to simplify the total differential of the welfare function (2.7) yields, instead of (2.9), the following: (3.2) dW = -5sdx + xp'dy + (l-5)xds.
To proceed further, it is necessary to relate changes in output levels to changes in the subsidy. This may be done by totally differentiating (3.1) and the corresponding condition for the foreign firm:
An implication of this is that, if 6 arises from the actions of a budgetconstrained public agency, then the sign of the optimal subsidy should be the same for all firms. Comparing this with (2.10) shows that, for 6 greater than or equal to 2, convex demand (p">0) tends to raise the optimal subsidy above the value it takes in the case of linear demand, and conversely for concave demand (p"<0).
Finally, the bracketed expression in (3.7) may be manipulated to show that the threshold value of 5, at which the optimal subsidy switches from a positive to a negative value, equals: 4p' + (x+2y)p" (3.8) 3p' + (x+y)p" 9 From this it is easy to derive: Proposition 3: Uith general non-linear demands, the threshold value of 6 at which the optimal subsidy switches from a positive to a negative value must be less than 2.
This confirms that the result found in Section 2 for the linear case carries over without substantial modification to the general case: it remains true that the optimal intervention is an export tax rather than a subsidy for surprisingly low values of 5.
International Subsidy Games with Cournot Competition
In Section 3 I showed that the influence of an asymmetry between social and private costs derived for the linear case in Section 2 continues*.to apply when the demand function is non-linear. Unfortunately, it is not possible to say anything concerning the effects of an asymmetry between home and foreign production costs on the optimal subsidy given by (3.7). However, it is possible to consider this issue if we assume that both governments pursue a policy of subsidising their own firm, choosing subsidy levels noncooperatively before firms choose their output levels. This approach was first explored by Brander and Spencer (1985) and was extended by de Meza (1986). In this section I extend the results of the latter paper to the case where 5 exceeds unity.
With a subsidy sx provided by the foreign government, the foreign firm's first-order condition is exactly analogous to that for the home firm, (3.1):
Proposition 3 may be establisned as follows:
2P' + x P " n (3.9) 2-6 = = **-. 3 P ' + (x + y) P " From (3.6), a necessary condition for a positive optimal subsidy is that good x be a strategic substitute for good y, i.e., that n VK be negative. But from (3.9), this is sufficient but not necessary for 2 to exceed 5. This shows that, with 6 equal to unity, the subsidy differential exactly equals the production cost differential when demand is linear and exceeds it when demand is non-linear.
A second case is when 6 exceeds unity but demand is either linear or convex (p"£0): then the coefficient of 0 in the expression for £, (4.6), must be negative whenever the home optimal subsidy (given by (3.7)) is positive.
Summarising:
Proposition 4: When a positive subsidy is optimal for the home government in a Nash subsidy game, sufficient conditions for the home subsidy to be relatively higher the more cost-competitive is the home firm are that either (a) the social opportunity cost of public funds 8 is close to unity; or (b) demand is non-concave.
The coefficient of 0 in (4.6) exceeds the bracketed expression in (3.7) by -yp" and so must be positive whenever s is positive and p" is nonnegative.
This shows that, in a significant fraction of cases, the result derived in Section 2 for the case where demand is linear and only the home government intervenes continues to hold when demand is non-linear and the two governments play a Nash game in subsidies: the more cost competitive is the home firm, the higher the subsidy which it should receive.
Bertrand Competition when Firms Move First
So far, I have assumed that both firms play a Cournot game, choosing output levels in a non-cooperative manner. As Eaton and Grossman (1986) have shown, if all the other assumptions are retained but firms are assumed to play Bertrand, then the optimal policy is an export tax rather than a subsidy. However, a role for subsidisation when firms play Bertrand can be salvaged along lines suggested by Carmichael (1987) and Gruenspecht (1988) .
In this section, I summarise their approach and then investigate the role ofĉ ost asymmetries in this framework.
The key feature of the Carmichael-Gruenspecht paradigm is a reversal of the order of moves by firms and governments. Specifically, they assume that governments decide on subsidy levels only after firms have set their prices.
While this may seem unlikely at first, Carmichael presents persuasive evidence that it characterises the behaviour of the US Exlm Bank; and it also appears to be a plausible description of the behaviour of the export credit agencies of many European countries. Essentially, it amounts to assuming that the government commits itself not to a subsidy level but to a subsidy rule and that the home firm chooses its price in the knowledge that both its own and its competitor's price will influence the level of the subsidy.
Since the equilibrium is perfect, this influence is taken into account by both firms in choosing their prices in the first stage of the game.
To formalise these ideas, I assume that products are differentiated and 12 that demands are linear and symmetric.
The home and foreign firms produce Products must be differentiated if an equilibrium in pure strategies is to output levels x and y, as before, and charge prices p and q respectively. First, the sign of the optimal subsidy is determined
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As explained in Gruenspecht (1988) and Neary (1991), this game is degenerate when 6 equals one. In that case, the government is indifferent between an extra dollar of corporate profits and a dollar less in subsidy disbursements; but, since the firm is not indifferent between these two options, it has an incentive to increase its price without limit. Hence profits and subsidy payments are unbounded and there is no optimal policy.
This result is obtained in a different form by Gruenspecht (1988).
solely by the value of o and it is positive if and only if 6 is less than 3. This is a much higher value than was found in the Cournot game of earlier sections.
Second, the level of the optimal subsidy is once again positively related to the competitiveness of the home firm: the greater is 0, the greater the potential for the home firm to earn extra profits and so the stronger the case for subsidising it.
Equation ( 
